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A Judicial Response to Hovering
Narcotics Smugglers:
United States . May May
Escalating narcotics smuggling along the coast of the southeastern
United States has prompted a judicial expansion of jurisdiction beyond
the traditional territorial limits. This expansion has mandated a liberal
interpretation of the Coast Guard's statutory power to effect arrests on
the high seas, a narrow interpretation of international maritime law and
a somewhat diminished standard of probable cause to make searches,
seizures and arrests on the high seas.
United States v. May Maly illustrates this trend towards liberalization
of search and seizure powers of U.S. law enforcement agencies upon the
high seas. In May May, the defendants who were apprehended on the
high seas and prosecuted for conspiracy to import marijuana, contested
the district court's jurisdiction in addition to asserting the constitutional
invalidity of the search, seizure and arrest. Finding that statutory au-
thority as well as probable cause existed, the court disallowed the consti-
tutional claims. Moreover, though the defendants had never been within
the territorial limits of the United States, jurisdiction was allowed to at-
tach because the "intended impact" of the defendant's acts was within
this country. Thus the defendants, who had never been within the
United States or even within its territorial waters, were subjected to the
substantive criminal laws of the United States.
On August 15, 1978, a Coast Guard cutter, the DURABLE, while
on routine patrol in the Gulf of Mexico, made contact with a flagless
merchant vessel heading toward the Texas coast. Various irregularities
sighted aboard the merchant vessel aroused the suspicion of the DURA-
BLE's commander;2 in his experienced opinion the vessel fit the pattern
of the classic mothership 3 used extensively in the importation of mari-
1 470 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
2 Id at 390-91. These factors were the hand-lettered, non-permanent name-board on the
vessel, the failure to have a home port noted on the stern, the presence of extra fuel drums on
the deck and the unusually large number of crewmen aboard the vessel. Additionally, an officer
of the DURABLE had received an informer's tip two weeks earlier about a large shipment of
marijuana which was to arrive off the coast of Texas during the month of August. This tip,
however, was given no weight by the court. Id at 389 n.3.
3 Id at 391. A mothership is usually a 70 to 90 foot, non-U.S. flag vessel found hovering
off the coast of the United States outside of territorial waters and carrying large quantities of
marijuana. The cargo is often loaded into smaller vessels which transport the contraband from
ship to shore.
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juana.
The merchant vessel was approached 4 and in response to an inquiry
by the Coast Guard, a spokesman for the SUPERFLY II stated that the
ship was Panamanian and enroute to Tampico, Mexico. At this point,
however, the SUPERFLY II was north of its stated destination and
heading away from that city in a northerly direction. While awaiting
orders, 5 the Coast Guard followed the merchant vessel, which, at times,
took evasive maneuvers. 6 The commander later received word that the
SUPERFLY II was not a registered vessel of Panama and permission was
given to board in order to identify the vessel. 7
Boarding took place about 135 miles off the Texas coast, at which
time the boarding party was authorized only to determine the ship's true
nationality. When the crew members expressed ignorance as to the loca-
tion of the ship's documents, the boarding party entered the cargo hold
to determine the main beam number of the vessel. 8 Upon entering, they
found the hold full of marijuana. The SUPERFLY II was then seized
and its crew members taken into custody. Afterwards, a general search
of the vessel produced charts which indicated the ship was to deliver its
cargo to smaller coastal vessels while hovering off the Texas coast. 9
The crew members of the SUPERFLY II were charged with con-
spiracy to import marijuana and to possess marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963.10 The defendants moved
4 When a Coast Guard vessel is on patrol and encounters another vessel, it is standard
operating procedure for the patrol vessel to attempt to determine the nationality of the encoun-
tered ship. Id at 388. Termed the right of approach or right of flag verification, this is accepted
practice in international law. See C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 271-
72 (4th ed. 1959); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (4th ed.
1960); H. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 64-65 (3d ed. 1959). See also The Con-
vention on the High Seas, art. 22, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (1958).
5 The commander had radioed the information he had on the SUPERFLY Ii to his
superiors and had asked for confirmation of its nationality and for permission to board. 470 F.
Supp. at 390.
6 Id at 391.
7 After determining that the SUPERFLY II was not a registered vessel of Panama, Coast
Guard officials consulted with the State Department and the Department of Justice before
granting permission to board the SUPERFLY II. Id at 391-92.
8 The nationality of a vessel can be determined by an examination of the main beam
number. It is permanently affixed through welding or carving to the main beam of the ship.
The main beam is similar to a spike running from the front to the back of the vessel below the
deck and above the holds. To ascertain the main beam number, one must go into the hold of
the ship. Id at 392 n.11.
9 Id. at 393-94.
1o 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides that "[alny person who attempts or conspires to com-
mit any offense defined in this subchapter (Subchater I-Control and Enforcement) is punish-
able by imprisonment or fine or both ....
21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976) provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit
any offense defined in this subchapter (Subchapter I-Import and Export) is punishable by
imprisonment or fine or both ....
These are the usual charges filed in extraterritorial drug smuggling cases. The principal
reason is that, unlike the general federal conspiracy act embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976),
neither of these statutes explicitly requires the allegation of an overt act within the United
States for a conviction. See Ficken, The 1935 Anti-Smuggling ,4ct Apphid to Hovering Narcotics Smug-
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to dismiss the charges or, alternatively, to exclude the evidence. In their
motion to dismiss, the defendants, whose actual nationality was Colom-
bian, claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction because they had never
made contact with the United States or its territorial waters.II The mo-
tion to suppress was premised on an assertion that the Coast Guard lack-
ed statutory and constitutional power for any boarding, search and
seizure which occurs in international waters. The Southern District
Court of Texas denied both motions.
The motion to dismiss was based solely upon lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Attacks on personal jurisdiction in extraterritorial drug
smuggling cases have proved futile due to reliance by the courts upon the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine. That doctrine states that any defendant in a federal
criminal trial, whether a citizen or not, and whether arrested in this
country or not, may not successfully challenge a district court's jurisdic-
tion over his person on the grounds that his presence before the court was
unlawfully obtained. 1 2
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court found that
the concept of extraterritorial application is implicitly contained within
the conspiracy charges under sections 846 and 963.13 Furthermore, the
court stated that allegation of an overt act is unnecessary under these
statutes. 14 Noting that the Fifth Circuit had sustained jurisdiction over
conspiracies involving nonresident aliens who were arrested on the high
seas and had never entered the United States,' 5 the court justified extra-
glers Beyond the Contguous Zone.- An Assessment Under International Law, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 700,
701 n.5 (1975).
II 470 F. Supp. at 394. Basically, there are three divisions of waters: internal waters,
territorial seas and the high seas. The latter encompasses an area known as the contiguous zone.
The territorial sea extends from the coast outward for three miles; within it the sovereign exer-
cises complete jurisdiction. Seaward of this limit is the high seas. However, for implementation
of some U.S. laws, such as customs, security and health laws, there is a contiguous zone which
extends nine miles from the three mile limit, resulting in a boundary twelve miles from the
coast. Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 56 (1977).
On the high seas, a nation-state exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all ships entitled to fly
its own flag. But generally, the high seas are not subject to the sovereignty of any state, and
reasonable regard must be given to the rights ofothers to use the high seas. See generally Conven-
tion on the High Seas, supra note 4.
12 The precedents for this doctrine are Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). In the former, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who was
convicted in a state court could not challenge the conviction on the ground that he was improp-
erly brought within the court's jurisdiction in violation of his fourteenth amendment right to
due process of law. In Freebie, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Ker, even in a situation in which
the defendant was forcibly abducted from another state, possibly in violation of federal kidnap-
ping statutes. See also United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 986-89 (5th Cir. 1975).
13 470 F. Supp. at 395. The court cited United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.
1979) for this proposition. There the court reasoned that under the objective view of jurisdic-
tion ascribed to by the United States, jurisdiction attaches to extraterritorial acts that are in-
tended to have an effect within this country. Consequently, Congress intended for 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846 and 963 to have extraterritorial effect since it did not limit the extent of their applica-
tion. Id. at 885.
14 470 F. Supp. at 395.
15 Id. (citing United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 986-89 (5th Cir. 1975); United States
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territorial jurisdiction under the "intended impacts" doctrine. This doc-
trine represents a method used by the judiciary to assert jurisdiction over
extraterritorial drug conspiracy crimes. If it can be demonstrated that
the extraterritorial acts of defendants charged with conspiracy to import
or possess a controlled substance were intended to have an effect within
the United States, the court will allow jurisdiction to attach.' 6
The district court in May May realized that the "intended impacts"
doctrine resulted in an expansive concept ofjurisdiction but found that it
comported with the decisions of the Fifth Circuit in cases involving drug
conspiracies. 'Using the scope of the drug problem to justify this concept
of jurisdiction, the court found that there was sufficient evidence in May
May to conclude that the cargo aboard the SUPERFLY II was intended
for the United States.'
7
The defendant's second claim, the motion to suppress, was based on
the Coast Guard's lack of statutory and constitutional power to board,
search and seize a stateless vessel and its crew in international waters.
Addressing the questions of statutory power, the court cited 14 U.S.C.
§ 89(a),18 stating: "[T]he Coast Guard is empowered to make inquiries
of, examine, search and seize any vessel on the high seas that is subject to
the jurisdiction of or the operation of any law of the United States."' 19
The court explained that the boarding, search and seizure were jus-
tified under this statute for two independent reasons. First, because the
conspiracy statutes conferred extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes in-
tended for the United States, the jurisdiction requirement of section
89(a) was satisfied. Thus, when probable cause existed to believe a for-
eign vessel on the high seas was violating section 846 or 963, the Coast
Guard was authorized to investigate and take action under section 89(a).
The court found that adequate probable cause existed to believe that the
SUPERFLY II was engaged in illicit activities. 20 Second, 2 ' because the
ship was a stateless 'vessel (i~e., no legitimate nationality could be dis-
cerned from the ship or its crew), the Coast Guard was justified in board-
ing to determine the vessel's actual registration and nationality. 22 Once
v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978), afdpercuriam, 588 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1979) (amplify-
ing and explaining its previous holding)).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 396.
18 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976) provides in relevant part: "The Coast Guard may make in-
quiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters
over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of
violations of laws of the United States."
19 470 F. Supp.'at 396-97.
20 The factors the court considered controlling were "the physical conditions of the
SUPERFLY II, its location when compared to its stated destination, its movements after its
contact with the DURABLE, its flying of a false flag, its crew's claim of a false nationality and
its being overmanned." Id at 400.
21 The Coast Guard based its boarding only on this second jusification put forward by the
court. Id at 392.
22 Id at 400. Set also authorities cited in note 4 supra.
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on board, probable cause to search was supplied by the odor of mari-
juana.2 3 Additionally, the marijuana found in the hold during the verifi-
cations of the main beam number was admissible under the plain view
doctrine.24
The court also addressed the defendants' contentions that the au-
thority of the Coast Guard under section 89(a) was curtailed by the Con-
vention on the High Seas. 25 The court held that since the SUPERFLY
II was a stateless vessel, it was not entitled to the treaty's protection.
26
Additionally, the court stated that even if the provisions of the treaty had
been broken, dismissal or suppression of the evidence would not necessar-
ily follow. Noting that exclusion would be a severe remedy, the court
cited United States v. Cadena27 as authority for the proposition that other
remedies, specifically those under article 22 of the Convention dealing
with compensation for damages, were sufficient to satisfy any damages
sustained by the defendants.
28
Finally, the court addressed the constitutional arguments that exclu-
sion should result from the lack of probable cause to search and seize and
from the failure of the Coast Guard to procure a search warrant. Proba-
bie cause was discerned from the suspicious circumstances surrounding
the SUPERFLY 11.29 Additionally, it was held that the defendants lack-
ed standing to contest the contraband found in the cargo hold of the ship
because none of those aboard had a legitimate expectation of privacy
therein. 30 This evidence was also admissible under the plain view doc-
trine because it was necessary to enter the hold to ascertain the main
beam number. Furthermore, exigent circumstances justified the failure
to procure a search warrant because the vessel was capable of movement
and had twice previously taken evasive maneuvers. 3' Thus, the court
pronounced the Coast Guard's actions in this case constitutionally sound.
The broad issue in May May concerns the legal authority of the
United States to police the high seas adjacent to its territorial waters in
efforts to prevent drug smuggling. The decision is quite important with
respect to this problem and preventive efforts. Within this issue, three
areas of inquiry arise. First, what is the extent of U.S. jurisdiction with
regard to extraterritorial drug conspiracies? Second, is the Coast Guard
statutorily authorized to board, search and seize vessels in international
waters? And third, to what extent does the fourth arfiendment protect
defendants in such situations?
Resolution of these questions will be facilitated by an analysis of the
23 470 F. Supp. at 400.
24 Id at 399 n.31.
25 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (1958).
26 470 F. Supp. at 398.
'7 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1979).
28 470 F. Supp. at 398-99.
29 See note 20 supra.
30 470 F. Supp. at 399.
31 Id. at 400.
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case law concerning extraterritorial drug conspiracies. The Fifth Circuit,
which encompasses the southeastern shores of the United States, has han-
dled a large number/of these cases and has been at the forefront in the
development of the law in this area. Consequently, five major Fifth Cir-
cuit cases dealing with extraterritorial drug conspiracies must be ana-
lyzed with respect to the evolution of the law and with an eye to their
ultimate impact o4i May May.
One of the first cases to deal with the jurisdictional range of 21
U.S.C. § 963 and with the statutory power of the Coast Guard to make
extraterritorial searches, seizures and arrests under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) was
United States v. Winter.32 The Coast Guard had seized an American-
owned and registered vessel carrying 1,130 pounds of marijuana thirty-
five miles off the coast of Florida and 11.9 miles from the nearest island
of the Bahamas. Sufficient probable cause was demonstrated for the
seizure and the court found adequate evidence of overt acts within the
jurisdiction of the district court. The defendants, (two American citi-
zens, two Jamaican nationals and one Bahamian national), were charged
with conspiracy to import a controlled substance pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§§ 952(a) and 963. The appeal by the two Americans and two Jamai-
cans was limited to challenging the trial court's jurisdiction over their
persons and the crime.
The Jamaicans argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion because they had not been in the territory of the United States prior
to the involuntary termination of the conspiracy and had committed no
overt acts within the country. The Fifth Circuit replied that the United
States subscribes to the objective view of the territorial principle of juris-
diction, which extends jurisdiction to all acts which have an effect within
the country. 33 The court observed that the overt acts of the Jamaicans'
co-conspirators were sufficient for jurisdiction to attach under the con-
spiracy statutes even if the Jamaicans had never been in the country. In
dictum it was noted that section 963 did not explicitly require proof of an
overt act, but the court resolved to settle that issue another day since the
indictment in the case did contain such an allegation.
One of the bases for contesting jurisdiction over the person was that
the Coast Guard had exceeded its jurisdiction to arrest. The defendants
asserted that jurisdiction could extend only to a maximum of twelve
miles from the U.S. coast as prescribed by statute 34 and treaty. 35 The
32 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975).
33 Id. at 981. See also Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) where the Supreme
Court discusses the effects doctrine under the objective theory of jurisdiction which extends it to
acts that have an effect within this country.
34 The defendants based this argument on 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 89(a) (1976).
35 This argument was based upon article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S. No. 5639 (1958). Article 24 pro-
vides that "a coastal state may exercise control over an area contiguous to its territorial sea but
not extending beyond 12 miles from its coast for the purpose of preventing and punishing in-
fringements of its customs, fiscal immigration and sanitary regulations." 509 F.2d at 984 n.30.
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court responded by stating that there was little if any current authority
relating to the personal jurisdictional requirements of section 89(a). Nev-
ertheless, the personal jurisdiction attack was rejected with a citation to
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.36
After W4inter it was unclear whether the "intended impacts" doctrine
conferred personal jurisdiction over defendants involved in extraterrito-
rial drug conspiracies, because the Ker-Frsbie doctrine allowed the court
to evade this issue. It was clear, however, that subject matter jurisdiction
attached to such crimes intended for the United States, and that where
probable cause existed, the Coast Guard had statutory authority to
board, search and seize domestic vessels on the high seas.
Two subsequent decisions dealt with the statutory power of the
Coast Guard under section 89(a) to make searches without probable
cause of American vessels on the high seas. In United States V. Odom 37 and
United States v. Warren38 the government argued that section 89(a) au-
thorized warrantless safety and documentary inspections (ite., adminis-
trative searches) 39 of American vessels upon the high seas. The Fifth Cir-
cuit agreed, but specified that the search must be limited in scope to its
original purpose of inspecting documents and safety equipment. 40 If,
however, while conducting a valid safety inspection, evidence emerged
providing probable cause to suspect a crime was being or had been com-
mitted, the Coast Guard was allowed to extend its search in ferreting out
criminal activity.4'
In Odom, inoperative fishing equipment, the reluctance of the cap-
tain to open the hold for a check of the main beam number, and the
apparent absence of ice and fish that the captain had asserted were in the
hold, supplied probable cause for the Coast Guard to extend its search,
resulting in the discovery of 6,000 pounds of marijuana. In Warren, how-
ever, the Coast Guard had brought along government agents and had
extended the safety and documentation inspection without probable
cause to do so. Evidence was ultimately found which implicated the pas-
sengers in marijuana smuggling. The Fifth Circuit upheld the search in
Odom, finding adequate probable cause to extend the administrative
search once the Coast Guard was validly on board. However, the court
found that the general search undertaken in f4'arren was offensive to the
fourth amendment due to the absence of probable cause during the ad-
ministrative safety and documentation inspection. The court stated that
section 89(a) authorized warrantless safety and documentation inspec-
36 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
37 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976).
38 550 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1977).
39 An administrative search is limited to verifying a vessel's documentation or safety
equipment. For an excellent discussion of the administrative search doctrine as it relates to the
high seas, see Carmichael, supra note I1, at 83.
40 550 F.2d at 225.
41id
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tions of American vessels by the Coast Guard, and that these searches
could be extended if probable cause to believe a crime was being com-
mitted became apparent. What was proscribed was the extension for in-
sufficient reason of a search for safety purposes beyond that reasonably
needed to determine if the safety and documentary regulations had been
followed.
42
The jurisdiction of the court and statutory authority of the Coast
Guard were subsequently extended to foreign vessels on the-high seas in
United State v. Cadena.43 The Coast Guard had probable cause to believe
a foreign freighter 200 miles off the Florida coast was carrying a large
quantity of marijuana. The Coast Guard boarded the vessel and, after
finding 50,000 pounds of marijuana, seized it along with thirteen Colom-
bian crew members. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to
possess marijuana with intent to distribute and with conspiracy to import
marijuana pursuant to sections 846 and 963. The defendants argued
against the search and-seizure on three grounds: (1) no authority existed,
statutory or otherwise, for boarding, searching and seizing a foreign ves-
sel in international waters; (2) if such authority did exist, the search and
seizure nonetheless violated the Convention on the High Seas which
overrides any domestic law to the contrary; and (3) the fourth amend-
ment was violated because no warrant was obtained and because the
lack of authority for the search and violation of the Treaty rendered the
search unreasonable for fourth amendment purposes. The Fifth Circuit
rejected all three arguments.
The court resorted to the objective theory44 to find that jurisdiction
attached to the crime and the vessel used to carry it out because the
defendants' acts were intended for the United States and adequate overt
acts had been alleged on the part of co-conspirators within this coun-
try. 4 5 Because jurisdiction attached under the conspiracy statutes, the
court asserted that the Coast Guard had statutory authority to board
and search the vessel pursuant to section 89(a). "The Coast. Guard de-
tained the vessel and searched it to detect and prevent a violation of the
laws of the United States, thus acting in accordance with the purpose of
the statute as set forth in its opening sentence."' 46 The challenge to per-
sonal jurisdiction was again dismissed by citation to the Ker-Frsbze doc-
trine. 47
The court addressed the defendants' contentions that the search,
seizure and arrest violated the Convention on the High Seas, and that
4 2 Id
43 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1979).
44 Id. at 1257. The objective theory ofjurisdiction asserts that jurisdiction is not limited to
the territorial limits, and is the basis for the intended impacts doctrine. See Ford v. United
States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
45 585 F.2d at 1257-58.
46 Id at 1259.
47 Id
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dismissal of the indictment or exclusion of the evidence should follow.
Violations of the Convention were held not to require dismissal or exclu-
sion because neither Canada (where the freighter was registered) nor Co-
lombia (where those aboard resided) had signed the Treaty.48 It was
asserted that only the signatory nations to a treaty, and not their individ-
ual citizens could protect its violation. Furthermore, dismissal or exclu-
sion was not mandated because article 22 of the Convention specified
remedies in the form of compensation for damages for violations of the
Treaty. 4
9
Finally, the court rejected the defendants' fourth amendment argu-
ments. The court stated that section 89(a) authorized the Coast Guard
to stop the vessel and that the stop was justified by the existence of prob-
able cause.50 The warrantless search was justified because of exigent cir-
cumstances since the vessel was mobile and had made an attempt to
escape when first sighting the Coast Guard. Respecting the defendants'
claim that the Coast Guard had violated international law thereby ren-
dering the search unreasonable for fourth amendment purposes, the
court found that even if international law had been violated, the fourth
amendment would not require exclusion because the interests to be
served by the amendment had not been violated.5
In Cadena it was found that the Coast Guard had sufficient probable
cause to believe the defendants were engaged in criminal activity; thus,
the subsequent search and seizure in international waters was justified.
Additionally, the traditional requirement under the conspiracy charge of
an allegation of an overt act within the judicial district was met. In the
following year it became necessary for the Fifth Circuit to address two
issues which had been left unresolved: what was the legality of a warrant-
less, non-probable cause, administrative search of a non-domestic vessel on
the high seas, and what was the status of jurisdiction of a conspiracy
charge when no overt act within the United States was alleged.
For the Fifth Circuit the administrative search doctrine was ex-
panded to apply to stateless vessels in extraterritorial waters in United
States v. Cortes.52 In a situation similar to May May, the Coast Guard
came across a vessel anchored in international waters which was flying
no flag and had no permanently affixed name. The crew members stated
that the ship was Colombian, but this could not be verified by the opera-
tions center in Miami. Consequently, the Coast Guard was authorized
to board to determine the nationality of the vessel. The crew members of
the vessel could produce no registration papers, so a limited administra-
48 Id. at 1260-61.
49 Id. at 1261.
50 Id. at 1263. The authority cited by the court, Praper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959), held that an arrest without a warrant may be made if the arresting officer has probable
cause to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing a felony.
51 585 F.2d at 1264.
52 588 F.2d at 106 (5th Cir. 1979).
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tive search was undertaken to locate the main beam number of the ship.
The boarding party entered the cargo hold and found it full of mari-
juana. The Colombian crew members were arrested and charged wth
conspiracy to import and with conspiracy to possess marijuana with in-
tent to distribute pursuant to sections 846 and 963. 5 3
The defendants contested the legality of the search because it was of
a foreign vessel in international waters. The court replied that under the
circumstances the Coast Guard was justified in its conclusion that the
vessel was stateless and that section 89(a) authorized the boarding to de-
termine the ship's nationality since the crew members could not give a
verifiable nationality. When no registration papers were forthcoming,
the extension of the search to locate the main beam number was justifia-
ble. The marijuana found in plain view created probable cause for
seizure of the vessel and exigent circumstances (zle., the possibility that
the vessel would weigh anchor and flee) justified the general search dur-
ing which additional evidence against the defendants was found.5 4
It was also found that the Convention on the High Seas gave no
protection to the defendants because it was inapplicable to stateless ves-
sels. Additionally, the right of approach 55 was cited as justification for
the Coast Guard's approach of the unidentified vessel to ascertain its
identity.56
Less than a month later the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Wil-
hams,5 7 addressed the jurisdictional applicability of the conspiracy to im-
port marijuana statute where no proof of an overt act within the judicial
district existed. The Panamanian vessel of the defendants, spotted by the
Coast Guard in international waters, was suspected of being involved in
international drug smuggling. Various factors supplied probable cause
to believe those aboard were engaged in criminal activities.58 The Coast
Guard received authority from the Panamanian Embassy via the State
Department to board the vessel and 21,000 pounds of marijuana were
found on board.
The defendants were charged with conspiracy to import marijuana
pursuant to section 963. The defendants objected to the charge on the
ground that no overt act had occurred within the territorial jurisdiction
of the district court. The Fifth Circuit countered by observing that the
indictment was brought in under section 963 which, unlike the general
53 Id. at 107, 108.
54 M. at 110, 111.
55 See note 4 supra.
56 588 F.2d at 110.
57 589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979).
58 The ship was seen hovering off the coast of Colombia with support boats nearby. Crew
members had beckoned the Coast Guard for over six hours and one crewman had jumped
overboard and swum to the Coast Guard cutter, where he stated that the vessel was engaged in
"dirty business." Also, in a business where time is money, the Panamanian vessel had remained
dead in the water, rejecting offers of assistance from the Coast Guard. Id at 214.
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federal conspiracy statute,5 9 did not explicitly require the commission of
an overt act. 60 The court referred to decisions which had held that sec-
tion 963 required no proof of an overt act 6' and went on to hold that
under section 963, proof of an overt act within the judicial district was
not a prerequisite for district court jurisdiction. 6 2 "Any other result
would have the anomalous requirement that more be shown for jurisdic-
tion than is necessary for conviction of the crime."
63
Additionally, the defendants alleged the stop of the vessel and its
warrantless search violated the fourth amendment. The court conceded
that before the government could order a foreign vessel to stop there
must be a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, but it
held that standard was amply met in Willams.6 4 Furthermore, though
no search warrant was obtained, the court stated that the defendants
lacked standing to contest the search of the cargo hold. The court noted
that the cargo of a merchant vessel is subject to inspection upon entering
and leaving a port, and consequently there could be no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the hold of a merchant vessel.
65
Williams was the last major case decided by the Fifth Circuit that
had a significant impact on May May. The previously summarized cases
exemplify the case law within the circuit at the time the May May case
came before the district court. Consequently, the decision is of no sur-
prise. All of the defendants' arguments had been previously struck down
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompasses the Southern
District Court of Texas. Immunity from serious scrutiny, however, is not
a necessary by-product of precedent. Various aspects of the decision, es-
pecially with regard to the three areas of inquiry previously mentioned,
are subject to doubt and may present future dilemmas which return to
challenge the court.
The defendants' attacks on personal jurisdiction in these cases re-
ceived little consideration in light of the Supreme Court's consistent re-
sponse on this issue. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is unequivocal authority for
dismissing such attacks. The only reported exception is Unted States v.
Toscanino.66 In that case the Second Circuit found governmental con-
duct which involved emotional and physical brutality so outrageous that
the defendant's attack on personal jurisdiction was sustained. 67 Appre-
59 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). See note 10 supra.
60 589 F.2d at 213.
61 United States v. Thomas, 567 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Palacios,
556 F.2d 1359, 1364 (5th Cir. 1977).
62 589 F.2d at 213.
63 fd
64 Id. at 214.
65 Id
66 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
67 Toscanino appealed from a narcotics conviction on the ground that the court had un-
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over him. He had been kidnapped from Uruguay by American
agents who took him to Brazil. There he was tortured for 17 days by such methods as electric
shock to his earlobes, toes and genitals, denial of food and denial of sleep. Although Brazilians
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hensions which fall short of the callous acts perpetrated in Toscan'no will
assuredly overcome personal jurisdiction attacks. Because the Coast
Guard usually makes arrests in such situations without the use of any
force, attacks on personal jurisdiction in extraterritorial drug arrests will
be useful to the defendant only in extremely rare factual contexts.
With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the court in May May
held that under the conspiracy statutes, sections 846 and 963, intended
impact within this country is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes and an
allegation of an overt act within the jurisdiction is unnecessary. Under
this standard, there appears to be no limit to the extension of U.S. juris-
diction under the conspiracy statutes if it can be demonstrated that the
crime's intended impact is within this country. Principles of national
sovereignty would prevent apprehension of defendants within the bor-
ders of another country, but within internatonal waters the intended im-
pacts doctrine suggests complete jurisdiction.
Extension of jurisdiction to such limits with respect to foreign vessels
violates the Convention on the High Seas. 68 Article 2 states that "the
high seas, being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to sub-
ject any part of them to its sovereignty." Article 6 confers exclusive juris-
diction on a nation over ships flying its own flag on the high seas, and
article 22 prohibits the boarding of a foreign merchant ship on the high
seas unless there is a reasonable ground for suspecting the vessel is en-
gaged in piracy, slave trade, or, though flying a foreign flag, is of the
same nationality as the boarding warship. This treaty, however, has
been interpreted narrowly where its provisions pose a barrier in an extra-
territorial drug conspiracy case. As demonstrated in the developmental
analysis, its provisions have been held inapplicable to non-signatory na-
tions, not protective of a valid fourth amendment interest, and with re-
medial requirements of only compensation for damages.
Various restrictive interpretations of the Convention are likely to be
used in future intended impact cases, at least until a signatory nation
formally protests a seizure of one of its citizens or vessels. Such an analy-
sis is consistent with the opinion of the Fifth Circuit expressed in Cadena
that only the signatory nations to a treaty and not their individual citi-
zens can protest its violation. 69 Cooperation prevails among nations in
the apprehension of drug smugglers, and it is safe to assume that few
nations would protest the seizure of a citizen where substantial evidence
of drug trafficking exists. 70 As a result, no end is seen to the use of the
intended impacts doctrine, in contravention of the plain language of the
perpetrated most of the torture, there was evidence that agents from the Department of Justice
and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs had supervised and participated in some of the
torture and interrogation. Id. at 269-70.
68 13 U.S.T. 2312, 45 U.N.T.S. 82, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (1958).
69 585 F.2d at 1261.
70 470 F. Supp. at 388.
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Convention on the High Seas, to confer jurisdiction over non-domestic
vessels charged with drug conspiracies.
A slight wrinkle in the intended impacts doctrine involves its appli-
cation to foreign vessels seized on drug charges in international waters
where the crew members can prove they had no intent to smuggle drugs
into the United States, but instead were bound for another country. No
other basis for jurisdiction appears in such circumstances and presuma-
bly the court would be forced to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Connected very closely with the jurisdiction issue in May May is the
statutory power of the Coast Guard to make arrests and seizures on the
high seas. The court found that under section 89(a) the Coast Guard was
authorized to board, search and seize any vessel subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States. Because it was the intended impacts doctrine
which granted the requisite jurisdiction upon which the Coast Guard's
statutory authority was contingent, the statutory authority of the Coast
Guard extends to any area of international waters where the intended
impacts test is applicable. This is directly at odds with article 2 of the
Convention on the High Seas which states that the high seas are open to
all nations and that no state may validly purport to subject any part of
them to its sovereignty. As May May and its predecessors illustrate, the
courts, in extraterritorial drug smuggling cases, are inclined to interpret
restraining international law very narrowly while, at the same time, giv-
ing broad effect to U.S. statutory law.
'These interpretations reflect the inherent problems of policing an
expansive coast in the face of an ever increasing volume of drug smug-
gling. Limiting jurisdiction and investigations to the twelve-mile contig-
uous sea has proved ineffective in dealing with the problem. If the courts
restricted the Coast Guaird to the contiguous zone, disallowing investiga-
tions and seizures beyond that area on the theory that the vessel had
committed no crime within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, smuggling prevention efforts would be severely hampered.
Motherships would hover off the coast at will, dispensing their cargo to
smaller, faster craft, which would transport the contraband to shore. A
few of the smaller boats would be apprehended, but the number would
be insignificant compared to those that made their destination.
The intended impacts test, with its broad delegation of jurisdic-
tional and statutory power is thus geared to achieve a given policy objec-
tive. The decision has been made by the judiciary that the Coast Guard,
to be effective in its efforts to prevent drug smuggling, must be allowed to
operate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Toward
this end, the courts have used the judicial vehicles of a liberal interpreta-
tion of statutory law with respect to jurisdiction and Coast Guard au-
thority, and a narrow interpretation of international law. May May is a
representative case applying this policy decision, and serves to illustrate
various aspects of its application.
494 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The broad statutory authority conferred upon the Coast Guard by
section 89(a) has been limited somewhat by the fourth amendment re-
quirement of probable cause. This is uniformly required before general
searches of vessels can be undertaken. The only searches which have
been authorized without probable cause are limited administrative
searches of domestic vessels for documentation and safety equipment or,
in the case of stateless vessels, administrative searches to confirm nation-
ality and registration. The basic conditions under which searches and
seizures have been validated on the high seas are:
(1) in the case of an American vessel, if probable cause exists before the
general search, or becomes apparent after a limited administrative
documentation and safety search;
(2) in the case of a stateless vessel, if probable cause exists before the
general search or becomes apparent after the limited administra-
tive search to confirm registration and nationality; or
(3) in the case of a foreign vessel whose registration can be proven, if
probable cause exists before the search.
Although probable cause must exist before extending an administra-
tive search, this has proved to be of slight impediment to the Coast
Guard. A haul of marijuana large enough to justify the trip is difficult to
hide from anyone on board a vessel, especially those who are trained in
its detection. Additionally, verifying the registration of a vessel by locat-
ing its main beam number in the hold will surely result in the applica-
tion of the plain view doctrine with respect to any marijuana found
therein. Consequently, the practical result of the administrative search
doctrine is to undermine the probable cause requirement. Only verifia-
ble foreign vessels are not subject to administrative searches, and once a
domestic or stateless marijuana laden vessel is boarded for an administra-
tive check, factors which provide probable cause to extend the search will
usually be present.
The search warrant requirement has not impeded the Coast Guard
in its search of vessels on the high seas. Where probable cause exists to
search a vessel, the exigent circumstances doctrine has invariably been
used to excuse failure to procure a search warrant. This doctrine excused
the warrantless search in United States v. Cadena 7 1 even where probable
cause existed several days before the search. Because ocean going vessels
are mobile and can easily dispose of their cargo, the rationale of the doc-
trine is clear; but, what is also clear is that these very factors will excuse
the procurement of a search warrant in almost every situation. For prac-
tical purposes then, there is no search warrant requirement with respect
to extraterritorial drug seizures on the high seas.
The eradication of illicit drug traffic is the primary purpose of the
conspiracy statutes embodied in sections 846 and 963.72 As its decisions
71 585 F.2d at 1263.
72 HR. Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprbttedrn [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4566, 4566.
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illustrate, the Fifth Circuit has decided that this policy is best imple-
mented by preventing contraband from ever reaching the territory of the
United States. United States v. May May is not a landmark case in this
field, but is instead an aggregation of previous holdings from separate
cases in the Fifth Circuit. It illustrates the various interpretations given
to statutory, constitutional and international law effecting the prevention
of coastal narcotics smuggling.
The "intended impacts" test has served to extend jurisdiction and
Coast Guard police power with the fourth amendment asserting only a
slight constraining force. As demonstrated, administrative searches and
exigent circumstances effectively limit the usefulness of fourth amend-
ment arguments to the majority of extraterritorial defendants charged
with drug violations. The intended impacts doctrine, however, serves to
foreclose jurisdiction if defendants can prove their extraterritorial acts
were not intended for the United States.
The extension of U.S. police power under the intended impacts doc-
trine and the restrictive interpretation given to the Convention on the
High Seas raise a number of potentially controversial legal questions. By
legitimizing the assertion of jurisdiction over any area of the high seas
where the intended impact test is applicable, is the United States es-
topped from contesting similar assertions by other countries? If the
United States can restrict the application of the Convention on the High
Seas with impunity, what justification is there to prevent other nations
from doing likewise? Might this not forbode the gradual demise of the
time-honored concept of freedom of the seas? By adopting this ap-
proach, the United States has set an example and given tacit approval
for other nations to assert jurisdiction to enforce their own domestic laws
on the high seas.
Hovering narcotics smugglers are a serious problem and it is clear
that restricting the Coast Guard to the territorial limits would prove inef-
fective in eliminating their activities. In extending the police power,
however, some steps should be taken to accommodate international law.
In its present form the intended impacts test is too flexible to be consis-
tent with the concept of freedom of the seas. What is proposed is a 200
mile limit on statutory and jurisdictional authority, at least as far as non-
resident aliens and their vessels are concerned. This would be analogous
to the 200 mile fishing conservation zone established by the Fishery Con-
servation Act of 1976. 73 Within this zone Coast Guard statutory power
and jurisdiction of the court would attach in much the same manner as
presently allowed by the Fifth Circuit. Outside the 200 mile limit the
authority of the United States would be limited to American vessels and
citizens, at least where no overt act within U.S. territory could be shown
on the part of the non-residents. This limit would support the concept of
freedom of the seas, while not seriously hampering efforts to prevent
73 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).
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coastal drug smuggling. Although a 200 mile limit is somewhat arbi-
trary, a line must be drawn in order that the broad assertion of jurisdic-
tion under the intended impacts doctrine does not serve to undermine
freedom of the seas and does not result in serious sovereignty disputes
which undermine U.S. relationships within the international commu-
nity.
-REX C. MORGAN
